Toward a More General Theory of Bureaucratic Accountability and Legislative Control

I develop a theoretical framework that encompasses the pre-existing strategies for evaluating whether bureaucratic agencies are accountable to legislative principals. I assume the legislature contains several types of principals, each with a different authority that determines their access to instruments of agency control. This access to the instruments of agency control allows principals to convey policy preferences that either contest or reinforce the preferences expressed by other principals. Empirically, I test whether the US Fish and Wildlife Service responds to the preferences of the legislature as it implements the federal Endangered Species Act. I find that legislators use oversight to divert the agency from the preferences of the enacting majority, as expressed through statutory controls. I also find that individua l acts of oversight enable legislators to convey contradictory preferences, which may create the appearance of an agency “out of control.” ? This research was generously supported by funding from the Center on American Politics and Public Policy at the University of California at Los Angeles and the National Science Foundation.