Equal sharing solutions for bicooperative games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we discuss the egalitarianism solution (ES) and center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value (CIV) for bicooperative games, which can be seen as the extensions of the solutions for traditional games given by Dutta and Ray [1] and Driessen and Funaki [2]. Furthermore, axiomatic systems for the given values are proposed. Finally, a numerical example is offered to illustrate the player ES and CTV. Keywords—bicooperative games, egalitarianism solution, centerof-gravity of the imputation-set value
منابع مشابه
The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games
In this paper we analyze ternary bicooperative games, which are a refinement of the concept of a ternary voting game introduced by Felsenthal and Machover. Furthermore, majority voting rules based on the difference of votes are simple bicooperative games. First, we define the concepts of the defender and detractor swings for a player. Next, we introduce the Banzhaf power index and the normalize...
متن کامل4 th Twente Workshop on Cooperative
The aim of the present paper is to study several solution concepts for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao [1], we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The firs result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value. Next, we define the co...
متن کاملThe core and the Weber set for bicooperative games
This paper studies two classical solution concepts for the structure of bicooperative games. First, we define the core and theWeber set of a bicooperative game and prove that the core is always contained in theWeber set. Next, we introduce a special class of bicooperative games, the so-called bisupermodular games, and show that these games are the only ones in which the core and the Weber set c...
متن کامل4 th Twente Workshop on Cooperative Game Theory
The aim of the present paper is to study several solution concepts for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao [1], we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The firs result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value. Next, we define the co...
متن کاملBiprobabilistic values for bicooperative games
The present paper introduces bicooperative games and develops some general values on the vector space of these games. First, we define biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games and observe in detail the axioms that characterize such values. Following the work of Weber [R.J. Weber, Probabilistic values for games, in: A.E. Roth (Ed.), The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley Ca...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011