Filling the Gaps in Hume's Vacuums

The paper addresses two difficulties that arise in Treatise 1.2.5. First, Hume appears to be inconsistent when he denies that we have an idea of a vacuum or empty space yet allows for the idea of an “invisible and intangible distance.” My solution to this difficulty is to develop the overlooked possibility that Hume does not take the invisible and intangible distance to be a distance at all. Second, although Hume denies that we have an idea of a vacuum, some texts in Treatise 1.2.5 are taken by interpreters to suggest that Hume nonetheless believes that there are vacuums in nature. I discuss the relevant texts and defend the view that Hume does not in fact countenance belief in vacuums. I conclude by outlining an interpretation of Hume’s intention in the Treatise that allows us to understand his discussion of ideas as having implications for the sciences. Treatise 1.2.5 opens with a simple argument against the idea of a vacuum: “If [it is] true, that the idea of space or extension is nothing but the idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order; it follows, that we can form no idea of a vacuum, or space, where there is nothing visible or tangible” (T 1.2.5.1; SBN 53).1 In Treatise 1.2.3Humeargues that the ideaof spaceor extension is the ideaof adispositionof colored or solid points, and in Treatise 1.2.4 he already concludes that “’tis impossible to conceive . . . a vacuum” (T 1.2.4.2; SBN 39). But other things Hume writes in Treatise1.2.5 compel us to question these results. Indeed, as I shall argue, Treatise 1.2.5 not only forces us to confront much of what Hume attempts to establish in Miren Boehm, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin– Milwaukee, PO Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201. Email: [email protected].