Electoral Control with Behavioral Voters

We present a model of electoral control with behavioral voters. The model captures two main regularities of voting behavior found in empirical studies: voters are forgetful and are in uenced by extraneous events beyond the control of public o cials (e.g. rain fall). Speci cally, we assume the voters' propensities to reelect the incumbent is governed by a stochastic reinforcement process instead of strategic reasoning. We study electoral control (i.e. public o cials' incentive exercise e ort) in such an environment. We show that even in the context of low-rationality, electoral control of public o cials can work well. However, the extent of control depends on the properties of the election and the electorate. Extraneous events that decrease a voter's propensity to reelect the incumbent bene t electoral control, as the incumbent must exert greater e ort to ensure reelection. Increasing the bene ts of holding o ce also has a positive e ect, while the degree of voter forgetfulness helps electoral control if and only if elections are held frequently. JEL classi cation: D03, D72, D83