Singular Propositions , Abstract Constituents , and Propositional Attitudes ∗

Consider one apparent conflict between Frege’s ideas in [1892] and Kaplan’s ideas in [1977] (published in this volume). From Frege, we have learned that the cognitive significance of coreferential names may be distinct. But Kaplan identifies the cognitive significance of a word or phrase with its character ([1977], p. 62). The character of an expression is a function from context to content, and the content of a proper name is its denotation. Consequently, unambiguous, coreferential names, which have the same denotation from context to context, must have the same “constant” character. Hence, they must have the same cognitive significance, contrary to Frege. The difference in cognitive value between “a = a” and “a = b”, where “a” and “b” are names, is still puzzling for Kaplan, something which he acknowledges in [1977] (p. 98). This paper offers a resolution of the conflict between Frege and Kaplan. The resolution substantiates Frege’s suggestion that the cognitive significance of unambiguous, coreferential names may be distinct, yet it preserves the following views of Kaplan: (a) that names are directly referential, in the sense that no intermediate entities, such as senses, are required to secure or determine their denotation, (b) that the content (or