Managerial incentives for compliance with environmental information disclosure programs

نویسندگان

  • Mary F. Evans
  • Scott M. Gilpatric
  • Michael McKee
  • Christian A. Vossler
چکیده

INTRODUCTION Publicly reported information on the environmental behavior of firms can increase the efficacy of private markets as a mechanism to control environmental malfeasance through liability for harm, consumer demand response, and shareholder reaction. Within the realm of environmental policy, examples exist of both mandatory information disclosure programs such as the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), and voluntary programs such as Energy Star (see U.S. EPA, 2001). In the case of mandatory information disclosure programs, firms are required to report information that is potentially damaging to them. Thus, an understanding of firm incentives under such programs is essential to evaluating their performance, improving their design, and motivating the emergence of new programs.

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تاریخ انتشار 2006