Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation
نویسندگان
چکیده
As the core operation of many public key cryptosystems, group exponentiation is central to cryptography. Attacks on its implementation in embedded device setting is hence of great concern. Recently, implementations resisting both simple side-channel analysis and fault attacks were proposed. In this paper, we go further and present an algorithm that also inherently thwarts differential side-channel attacks in finite abelian groups with only limited time and storage overhead.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
دوره 2006 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006