Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case

نویسندگان

  • Francesco De Sinopoli
  • Giovanna Iannantuoni
چکیده

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters’ preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Social Choice and Welfare

دوره 30  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008