Self - Enforcing Electronic
نویسندگان
چکیده
Verifiable electronic voting has been extensively researched for over twenty years, but few protocols have achieved real-life deployment. A key impediment, we argue, is caused by the existing protocols' universal reliance on the probity of the tallying authorities. This might seem surprising to many people as dependence on tallying authorities has been a de facto standard in the field. However, this dependence is actually a legacy inherited from traditional physical voting, one that has proved problematic in the electronic context. In this paper, we propose a radically new concept called "self-enforcing electronic voting", which refers to voting systems that are free from reliance on any tallying authority. This proposal goes significantly further than all existing or proposed e-voting systems. We explain the feasibility of this new approach, with a theoretical definition of the system properties, a concrete engineering design, a practical implementation, and real-world trial experiments. We also highlight some open issues for further research. © 2012 Newcastle University. Printed and published by Newcastle University, Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. Bibliographical details HAO, F., RANDELL, B., CLARKE, D. Self-Enforcing Electronic Voting [By] F. Hao, B. Randell, D. Clarke Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle University: Computing Science, 2012. (Newcastle University, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-1311)
منابع مشابه
DRE-i and Self-Enforcing E-Voting
This chapter1 describes a research experience of designing, implementing and trialling a new e-voting system called Direct Recording Electronic with Integrity (DRE-i). DRE-i is an example of a new category of voting systems that are end-to-end (E2E) verifiable without involving any tallying authorities. Such voting systems are termed “self-enforcing e-voting”.
متن کاملSelf-enforcing Electronic Voting
Veri able electronic voting has been extensively researched for over twenty years, but few protocols have achieved real-life deployment. A key impediment, we argue, is caused by the existing protocols' universal reliance on the probity of the tallying authorities. This might seem surprising to many people as dependence on tallying authorities has been a de facto standard in the eld. However, th...
متن کاملTowards Fair Indictment for Data Collection with Self-Enforcing Privacy
Recently, multiple cryptographic schemes for data collection with self-enforcing privacy were proposed by Golle et al. The schemes allow participants of electronic polls to prove a pollster’s guilt if he distributes responses. Introducing punitive damages for such misbehaviour creates incentives for a pollster to protect the respondents’ privacy. To achieve fairness, a proof must be feasible if...
متن کاملSelf-enforcing climate-change treaties.
In the absence of world government, an effective treaty to control the emissions of greenhouse gases should be self-enforcing. A self-enforcing treaty has the property that, if a country expects other countries to abide by the treaty, it will be in the self-interest of that country to abide by the treaty too. (A difficulty with the Kyoto Protocol is that it does not appear to lay the groundwork...
متن کاملThe Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d’Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently assume that countries are identical, and they can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs and also two types of asymmetric countries. Extending a model of Bar...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012