You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms

نویسندگان

  • Yuval Deutsch
  • Thomas W. Ross
چکیده

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Management Science

دوره 49  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2003