Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci
نویسنده
چکیده
QuiSci is incredible fast, faster than most other ciphers. On modern CPUs it needs only arround 1 clock cycle per byte, so it is 10 times fast than most other well-known algorithm. On the website of QuiSci [1] it is claimed that this algorithm is secure. With this paper I like to show a key recovery attack on QuiSci, exploiting the weak key setup. When you are able to guess the beginning of the plaintext, its takes only a very small amount of time (less than a second) to decipher the whole message. You can find a implementation for this attack on [2].
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عنوان ژورنال:
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
دوره 2009 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009