On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 8 January 2008 Available online 13 June 2009 JEL classification: C72 D43 L13
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 68 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010