Licensing process innovations when losers' messages determine royalty rates
نویسندگان
چکیده
Next, we show that ∂zπL(x,z,y)|z=x =−qL(y)γ(y), where γ(y)> 1 for all y. ∗Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Economics, Guoding Road 777, 200433 Shanghai, China, Email: [email protected] †Sung-Buk Ku An-am Dong 5-1, Seoul 136-701, Korea, Email: [email protected] ‡Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University at Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany, Email: [email protected]
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 82 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013