Is Game Theory Compatible with Clausewitz’s Strategic Thinking?

Although game theory is a rather young area of science, it is already well established in the fi eld of mathematically oriented decision-making techniques. Initially its fi ndings were mainly aimed at describing and explaining economic processes, later however these concepts of thinking were also applied to political and military-strategic problems. The development and implementation of the fl exible response nuclear strategy was based on game theoretical calculi, but it has also been applied to arms control, as well as confi dence and security-building measures. In Clausewitz’s broad array of works, including his opus magnum, the book “On War,” one can fi nd a great deal about strategy. For a basic understanding of his arguments, it is important to keep in mind the fact that he has certainly not written a doctrine, but strives rather to give a guide on how to think: “Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time.”1 Clausewitz’s main concern, therefore is to train the strategic spirit, and not to try to press a commander into a tight corset of rules. To do so he describes the basic, permanently changing nature of war and he shows the instruments of analysis, which should be taken into consideration in a concrete strategic situation. Using this as a point of departure, the subsequent contribution2 tries to deal with the question of whether a strategic calculation, based on game theory, can be derived from Clausewitz’s (philosophical) concept. If this should prove to be the case, then game theory must certainly become a further element in the toolbox of Clausewitz’s instruments of analysis. The origin of a systematic development of game theory is connected with the names John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. In 1928 Neumann