Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets
نویسنده
چکیده
A bargaining solution based on the Rubinstein–Safra–Thomson ‘ordinal Nash’ outcome is investigated in the Peters–Wakker ‘revealed group preferences’ framework. Assuming non-expected utility preferences, necessary and sufficient conditions are stated on preference pairs in order for the solution to be well-defined and axiomatized uniquely. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C78
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 59 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007