Animal Consciousness as a Test Case of Cognitive Science

§1 Animal Minds? In our dealings with animals at least most of us see them as conscious beings. We say “the dog feels pain” ascribing sensation. We notice “My cat wants to get in the kitchen because she thinks there is some cheese left” ascribing beliefs and desires. On the other hand the employment of human categories to animals seems to be problematic. Reflecting on the details of human beliefs, for example, casts serious doubt on whether the cat is able to believe anything at all. These theses try to reflect on methodological issues when investigating animal minds. Developing a theory of animal mentality seems to be a test case of the interdisciplinary research programme in cognitive science. From the philosopher`s perspective the most pressing problem is how to talk about animal minds. Can we just employ the vocabulary of human psychology? If not, exploring animal minds contains the non-trivial task of introducing a terminology that allows to see the distinctness of animal minds and to see its connection to the human case. Dealing with that problem can by a genuine job for a philosopher of (animal) mind in cognitive science. So the title “animal consciousness” may be a misnomer to start with. Speaking of “animals” without qualification is another misnomer. Within the animal kingdom we should expect quite different cognitive abilities. An ape may do what a monkey can`t, a monkey what a mouse can`t, a mouse what a tuna can`t ... up to insects or some phyla where there is no mind at all. So we have to pay attention to this as well.