Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private Information

نویسنده

  • JAMES E. BESSEN
چکیده

When innovation is cumulative, early patentees can hold up later innovators. Under complete information, licensing before R&D avoids holdup. But when development costs are private information, ex ante licensing may only occur in regimes with sub-optimal patent policy.

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تاریخ انتشار 2004