Correspondence: Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy

In “Posing Problems without Catching Up,” Thomas Christensen criticizes balance-ofpower arguments that highlight the United States’ relative military superiority and proclaim that China is not a military threat. Instead, he argues that asymmetric strategies (waiting until the U.S. military is bogged down elsewhere, undermining the United States’ Asian alliances, emphasizing information and electronic warfare, etc.) allow China to pose major problems for U.S. security interests without the need to catch up militarily. He also suggests that Chinese policymakers view the United States as weakwilled (the Somalia analogy), thus increasing the likelihood of misperception and conict in the Taiwan Strait. Christensen therefore recommends that the United States deter Chinese belligerence through enhancing its military capabilities and demonstrating that it has the political will to Žght.1 Christensen’s approach to Chinese motivation is too narrow. Intentions should not be inferred from power alone, whether relative or asymmetric. The actions of other states and a variety of emotions (pride, anger, etc.) also inuence decisionmakers. Christensen’s policy prescriptions are also problematic. In arguing that the United States build up its military capabilities and demonstrate resolve to disabuse the Chinese of notions about an American lack of will, Christensen is overly optimistic about the ability of the United States to control Chinese interpretations of its behavior. What Americans view as defensive displays of resolve, Chinese may view as acts of belligerence, provoking the very aggression that the United States seeks to deter. Even more ominously, credibility arguments play into the hands of China-bashing hawks, undermining the U.S. national interest in stable bilateral relations.