Computational Game Theory Spring Semester , 2009 / 2010 Lecture 5 : 2 - Player Zero Sum Games
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چکیده
are completely competitive, where whatever one player wins, the other loses. Examples of such games include chess, checkers, backgammon, etc. We will show that in such games: • An equilibrium always exists (although not necessarily a pure one); • All equilibrium points yield the same payoff for the players; • The set of equilibrium points is actually the cartesian product of independent sets of equilibrium strategies per player.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2010