A Logic of Knowledge and Strategies with Imperfect Information

نویسنده

  • Francesco Belardinelli
چکیده

In this paper we put forward Epistemic Strategy Logic (ESL), a logic of knowledge and strategies in contexts of imperfect information. ESL extends Strategy Logic by adding modal operators for individual and collective knowledge. This enhanced framework allows us to represent explicitly and to reason about the knowledge agents have of their own and other agents’ strategies. We provide a semantics to ESL in terms of epistemic concurrent game models, then illustrate the expressive power of ESL as a specification language for games, both of perfect and imperfect information. Notably, we show that some fixed-point characterisations of operators for strategic abilities, which normally fail in contexts of imperfect information, can be recovered in a controlled way through the interplay of epistemic and strategy modalities.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Dealing with imperfect information in Strategy Logic

We propose an extension of Strategy Logic (SL), in which one can both reason about strategizing under imperfect information and about players’ knowledge. One original aspect of our approach is that we do not force strategies to be uniform, i.e. consistent with the players’ information, at the semantic level; instead, one can express in the logic itself that a strategy should be uniform. To do s...

متن کامل

Model-Checking Alternating-Time Temporal Logic with Strategies Based on Common Knowledge is Undecidable

We present a semantics for the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) with imperfect information, in which the participants in a coalition choose their strategies such that each agent’s choice is the same in all states that form the common knowledge for the coaltion. We show that ATL with this semantics has an undecidable model-checking problem if the semantics is also synchronous and the agents...

متن کامل

Social Value of Information and Optimal Communication Policy of Central Banks

Monetary policy as a tool for expectations management is believed to be most effective if it can coordinate the beliefs and expectations of the economic agents. The optimal communication policy is in an environment where central bank announcements are common knowledge and abundant information is complete transparency. The above conclusion is altered in the more realistic situation where economi...

متن کامل

The Proposed Model of the Effect of Knowledge Strategies on Organizational Performance with the Mediating Role of Ethical Leadership

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of knowledge strategies on organizational performance with the mediating role of ethical leadership. The present research is a correlational-analytical study in terms of applied purpose. The statistical sample size is 196 people. Data analysis was performed using structural equations through smartpls3 software. Findings showed that knowledge s...

متن کامل

Lottery Semantics: A Compositional Semantics for Probabilistic First-Order Logic with Imperfect Information

We present a compositional semantics for first-order logic with imperfect information that is equivalent to Sevenster and Sandu’s equilibrium semantics (under which the truth value of a sentence in a finite model is equal to the minimax value of its semantic game). Our semantics is a generalization of an earlier semantics developed by the first author that was based on behavioral strategies, ra...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015