On Equilibria in Continuum Games
نویسنده
چکیده
A substantial generalization of the usual continuum game model is obtained by the introduction of a new feeble topology on the set of action prooles, which no longer presupposes their inte-grability. Another improvement of the model concerns a reduction of the usual quasi-concavity condition. Moreover, new light is shed on a serious inconsistency in the usual model for continuum games with non-ordered preferences, exposed in Balder (1996c).
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تاریخ انتشار 1997