Part III Static Games of Incomplete Information
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Informational Aspects of a Class of Subjective Games of Incomplete Information : Static Case
Subjective games of incomplete information are formulated where some of the key assumptions of Bayesian games of incomplete information are relaxed. The issues arising because of the new formulation are studied in the context of a class of nonzero-sum, two-person games, where each player has a different model of the game. The static game is investigated in this note. It is shown that the proper...
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In this research UF cheese pricing is considered and Pegah, Pak, Kaleh, Rouzaneh and Mihan firms’ data, as five main UF cheese competitive firms of Iran in breakfast cheese competitive market, is used. By using these firm’s sales data, production data and price of each ton of UF cheese in nineteen work-periods (each work-period is 6 months), their sales equations are estimated for each work-pe...
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In analyses of sponsored search auctions for online advertising, it is customary to model the dynamic game of incomplete information by considering a static games of complete information. This approach is used in Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007) (EOS), Varian (2007), and the subsequent literature. Modeling complex interactions in uncertain environments as games of complete information has ...
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We experimentally examine equilibrium refinements in static and dynamic binary choice games of complete information with strategic complementarities known as “entry” games. Examples include speculative attacks, bank runs and refinancing decisions by multiple lenders. We explore behavior when the value of a payoff relevant state variable is known to all players in advance of making their action ...
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Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it diffi cult to explain the empirical evidence for a large number of static games such as prisoner’s dilemma, voting, public goods, oligopoly, etc. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games of complete and incomplete information, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign diagnostic ...
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تاریخ انتشار 2005