3 Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory : CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns

نویسنده

  • James H. Davis
چکیده

Agency theory argues that shareholder interests require protection by separation of incumbency of rôles of board chair and CEO. Stewardship theory argues shareholder interests are maximised by shared incumbency of these rôles. Results of an empirical test fail to support agency theory and provide some support for stewardship theory.

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تاریخ انتشار 1991