Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others; We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature. ∗Fudenberg: Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, e-mail: [email protected]; Kamada: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale, New Haven, CT 06511, and Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, e-mail: [email protected]; We are grateful to Pierpaolo Battigalli, Eddie Dekel, Ignacio Esponda, Faruk Gul, Yuhta Ishii, David Kreps, David K. Levine, Alex Peysakhovich, Jérôme Renault, Tomasz Strzalecki, the two referees, and seminar participants at Harvard University, Princeton University, Tel Aviv University, Toulouse School of Economics, and University of Tokyo for helpful comments. NSF grants SES-0646816 and SES-0951462 provided financial assistance.
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