Implementation in Multidimensional Symmetric Single - Peaked Domain
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider dominant strategy implementation in a specific symmetric single-peaked mutidimensional private values setting, where the set of alternatives is finite. A type is multidimensional because it is characterized by the peak and the value at the peak. The utility functions are standard quasi-linear with transfers apprearing linearly. We show that monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementability in such domains.
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تاریخ انتشار 2012