Are Experts Forward Thinking? Expertise as a Criterion for Selecting an Equilibrium Refinement Concept

This study provides experimental evidence on using expertise of players in a game as a criterion for selecting an equilibrium refinement concept. Research in psychology on differences between experts and novices is used to motivate the hypothesis that forward induction could be a suitable refinement principle for games played by experts. This hypothesis is examined using a game of complete information where a combination of context and the subjects’ background is used to manipulate expertise. The experimental evidence shows that more experts than novices play in accordance with the predictions of forward induction. As a result, the unique equilibrium outcome consistent with forward induction is more prevalent in the games played by experts than in those played by novices. The possibility that the particular structure of the game creates a natural focal point that can confound the results is also addressed. Experts play differently when there are multiple equilibria consistent with forward induction with only the focal point to guide them.