Hybrid Regimes and Arab Democracy

ON APRIL 30, 2006, the Egyptian Parliament voted by a large majority to renew the emergency law. This law grants the president extraordinary powers to detain citizens, prevent public gatherings, and issue decrees with little accountability to Parliament or the people. The vote was a famil­ iar ritual: the Egyptian Parliament has routinely approved the emergency law for most of the past forty years.1 However, this acquiescence to presi­ dential power is not universal. A few months prior to the April vote, the Supreme Constitutional Court issued a ruling that substantially limited the scope of the president’s authority under the emergency law. The Court’s decision prohibited the president from using the emergency law to assert government control over private property in non-emergency situations, and admonished the prime minister for applying it in a man­ ner that disregarded the constitutional rights of Egyptians.2 Many civil society groups also challenged the law, especially the Muslim Brother­ hood. It organized several demonstrations to protest the parliamentary vote and criticized the law extensively in the media. Its parliamentary dele­ gation denounced the measure as contrary to the principles of Islam be­ cause it ignored the wishes of the Egyptian people and failed to serve the public interest.3 These events illustrate a growing contradiction in contemporary Egypt. An observer could easily conclude that the country is a classic example of