Yves R. Simon on the Nature and Role of Moral Philosophy

In the latter stage of modem philosophy in the nineteenth century, leading thinkers stated their intention to overcome an objectionable antinomy by somehow combining theory and practice. Hegel remained a notable exception to this trend when he insisted that the philosophic science of right, and the state, was theoretical. Once those who argued, in opposition, that the task of philosophers was to change, not merely interpret the world, it was the theory of practice that was paramount. Of course, there were those who simply would do away with theory altogether and adopt a kind of practicalism, but usually, as with the utilitarians and positivists, some kind of theory was still required even if the main direction was practical. More recently, John Dewey, set out to overcome any dichotomy between theory and practice, knowing and doing, having discarded the idea of a purely theoretical philosophy. 1 Richard Rorty's version of pragmatism, free of Dewey's scientism, simply embraces localized practice.2 At least one wellknown proponent of the Analytic school has accepted the division of theoretical and practical knowledge, but then proceeds to deal with ethical concepts in a completely theoretical fashion. 3 Parallel in many respects to Dewey, Habermas-searching for the tasks remaining to philosophical thought "after the breakdown of metaphysics"-maintained, "The future of philosophical thought is a matter of political practice." So the tendency apparent in anum-