Strategic Leader Readiness and Competencies for Asymmetric Warfare

B oth current and past senior civilian defense officials reportedly have grown increasingly frustrated with the conventional mindset of many strategiclevel military officers. In their view, too many senior leaders are too cautious, lacking the “fresh thinking, creativity, and ingenuity” to engage in the “out-ofthe-box” thinking required to fully understand the new asymmetric threats and challenges posed by the global war on terrorism. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech delivered at National Defense University on 31 January 2002, made clear that in his view, “The future will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances.” General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also recently noted how al Qaeda and Taliban fighters have “made lots of adaptations to our tactics and we’ve got to continue to . . . try to out-think them and to be faster at it.” At the heart of the issue is whether and how the operational art and leadership attributes differ, if at all, in symmetric versus asymmetric approaches to warfare. The conceptual underpinning of these statements and criticisms also raises significant questions about whether asymmetric warfare poses unique challenges for strategic leaders or whether it more appropriately requires time-