Should governments in Europe be more aggressive in pushing for gender equality to raise fertility? The first “YES”

Together with three colleagues, I have been asked by the MPIDR to debate the following question: “Should governments in Europe be more aggressive in pushing for gender equality to raise fertility? Setting aside the “lighthearted” side of this “Rostocker Debate,” (12 minutes for each speech, one minute for each comment), I saw this as a good opportunity to think about the stakes behind the question. In order to address this complex issue, it is necessary to think about the many “preliminary questions” that we have to ponder before responding: Why should fertility be raised? Are political measures legitimate? Are they efficient? On what basis are we qualified to give “expert” opinions on such a topic? When the question comes to the fore, we as scholars are sometimes asked to provide an answer. It would, of course, be more comfortable not to answer, but our interlocutors (politicians, journalists, teachers, and also funding agencies) often want a definite response one way or the other. Even though our position may be a matter of politics as well as a matter of science, we must give an answer. The empirical evidence shows that European countries where gender inequality is lower are also the countries where fertility is the highest. This is the evidence-based response that we can give to that question. European countries need to find a new equilibrium after the end of the baby boom period, when gender equality was very low. In all countries, the empowerment of women is underway, thanks to the economic independence given by work-related income. Increasing gender equality is an efficient way to reduce the opportunity costs of having and raising children, and thus to increase fertility. 1 This is the second of two “yes” positions taken from the “Rostock Debate on Demographic Change” held at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research on 21 February 2006. 2 Institut national d ́études démographiques (INED) E-mail: [email protected] Toulemon: Rostock Debate, first YES: European governments must be more aggressive for gender equality http://www.demographic-research.org 180 Finally, “pushing for gender equality” may have many positive effects other than raising fertility, and has few negative side effects. Gender equality is thus a convenient political aim per se; an institutional goal which leaves many political questions open. So, yes, we agree that governments in Europe should be more aggressive in pushing for gender equality to raise fertility! 1. Preliminary questions The question of whether governments in Europe should be more aggressive in pushing for gender equality to raise fertility is, indeed, very complicated. First, the wording of the question is based on two implicit assumptions which have to be tested: that fertility in Europe should increase, and that governments should act to raise fertility. Second, our answer as scholars is also based on two implicit assumptions: that we are qualified, and that our scientific knowledge makes our answer meaningful; and that we have the political legitimacy to answer the question. None of these four assumptions is obviously true. Before addressing the main point, it is thus necessary to tackle these four preliminary questions about the diagnosis of fertility levels, the legitimacy of state action, the actual efficiency of pronatalist policies, and, last but not least, our legitimacy as “experts.” 1.1 Is fertility too low in Europe? 1.1.1 Where is the limit: 2.1, 1.8, or 1.5? The answer to the question of whether fertility is too low seems simple: the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman has been made very popular by demographers. If the total fertility rate is lower than this limit, then the net reproduction rate (number of daughters per woman) is lower than one, and the population decreases; if it is higher than 2.1, the population increases. The limit of 2.1 is sometimes likened to the sea level: it does not make any difference whether you are just below or well below, because if you want to breathe you must be at this level or above. Yet pronatalist demographers living in countries where fertility is below 1.3 children per women often say that 1.8 would be good enough, or that even 1.5 would be sufficient (Golini 2003; McDonald 2003, 2005). To give a diagnosis on the level of fertility, we must have a precise criterion in mind. Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 7 http://www.demographic-research.org 181 1.1.2 Stationarity as a target To determine whether fertility is too low or too high, we need to have an optimum level in mind. Let us assume that having a stationary population (constant size, stable age structure, constant number of births) is the target. As mortality is still declining, and is almost negligible before the end of childbearing ages, our optimum could be a quasistationary population with a constant population size before the age of 50, and a slowly increasing population at older ages due to the mortality decline. Of course other targets could be suggested, such as positive or negative long-term or short-term population growth, so the idea of stationarity is not the one and only possible target. An increasing population may be considered to be a driver of economic growth, or a burden for child care institutions. There is no room here to discuss the other possible fertility indices: cohort fertility differs from period fertility when fertility timing is changing, the number of births also depends on the number of parents-to-be aged between 20 and 40, the transition to a stationary population is not immediate, etc. We may assume that a period TFR of 2.1 is the target. 1.1.3 Is the birth deficit an individual problem or a population problem? Two kinds of arguments can be used to justify the need to raise fertility. On the one hand, couples want to have more children; on the other hand, countries are facing a birth deficit. Note that the first argument, even if very common, is not necessarily true. In order to be consistent, the comparison between total fertility and ideal family size would compare the latter to the cohort fertility of women who ever lived as a family. During the baby boom period, the number of births was much higher than ideal fertility. In recent years, the gap has been low in some European countries, like France and Germany (Toulemon and Leridon 1999; Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 2004), where the pronatalist view is currently common among politicians. In France, the fertility level is exactly at the replacement level, when migration is taken into account (Toulemon and Robert-Bobée 2006). In Germany, the responses to survey questions about ideal family size indicate that the mean ideal number is low, with a large proportion of young adults answering that a childless family is the ideal size; and actual period fertility is accordingly low. Moreover, fertility intentions are not constant over the life course, and many couples have more or fewer children than expected (Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003). Another approach is to focus on the perceived interest of the country as a whole, irrespective of the desires of couples. These two criteria currently converge in some Toulemon: Rostock Debate, first YES: European governments must be more aggressive for gender equality http://www.demographic-research.org 182 countries, but not everywhere. The rationale for a demographic policy may not necessarily be to fulfil the wishes of couples, as there is no reason why the summing of individual behaviors should lead to an optimum. If we have an optimum in mind, we may argue that couples who move in the “right direction,” or who want to do so, must be helped, but this may be contrary to other political aims, such as equity. It might be better to think in terms of institutional settings which lead to an “acceptable” level of fertility, not in terms of helping some people specifically. 1.1.4 Conclusion: It’s OK to say that fertility is certainly not too high... Going back to our preliminary question, we may agree that almost all population projections anticipate a population decline in all European countries except for Ireland and France, while the world population will increase by some 50% in the next 50 years (Eurostat 2006; United Nations 2007). Thus, even if the question of whether fertility is currently too low is by no means straightforward, we may agree on the diagnosis that fertility in Europe is not too high, and that in some countries it may be as too low. 1.2 Should governments take action to change fertility? Let us assume that the fertility level is currently too low in Europe. This takes us to our second preliminary question: Should governments take action to change fertility? 1.2.1 Yes, but only if we are in a dangerous situation Here we could add another criterion: fertility is a private matter, and governments should, as far as possible, avoid interfering (van de Kaa 2006). An exception could be made if it is determined that the country (or the continent) is facing a dangerous situation, because couples are behaving in a way that threatens society. The question then moves from “Is fertility too low?” to “Is fertility so low that the state is entitled to interfere?” As previously noted for the target level of fertility, the “limit” value under which fertility is assumed to be “much too low” is sometimes set at 1.3 (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002), and sometimes at 1.5 (Lutz and Skirbekk 2005; McDonald 2006), while 1.8 is considered a tolerable, if not optimal value (Golini 2003). Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 7 1.2.2 Are European countries in a dangerous situation? Halving time, migration Table 1 below may be useful for determining what kind of diagnosis may be derived from each level of fertility. The first line presents several levels of the TFR, from 2.0 to 1.0, together with the value of 2.08, which corresponds to a constant population over the long run, in the absence of migration. The net reproduction rate R0 represents the ratio of the cohort size of daughters to the cohort size of mothers. For a mean age at childbirth of 30 years, each value of the TFR may be associated with an instant growth rate r. Two more concrete descriptions of this growth rate are presented in Table 1. The first is the halving time T, or the length of time necessary for the population size to halve. With a TFR of 2.08, the population is constant (r=0) and the halving time is infinite. With a TFR of 1.9 (the value assumed in the central fertility scenario of the last official population projection in France, see Robert-Bobée 2006), the halving time is 230 years; while with a TFR of 1.3 (like in Germany), it is 44 years. The level of urgency is clearly not the same in both countries (Morgan and Taylor 2006). Table 1: Halving time and net migration (as a proportion of births) necessary to maintain stationarity, for several values of the Total Fertility Rate Total fertility rate (TFR) 2.08 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 Net reproduction rate R0 1 0.96 0.91 0.82 0.72 0.63 0.53 0.48 Mean age at childbirth 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 Instant r (per 1000) 0 -1.3 -3.0 -6.7 -10.9 -15.7 -21.2 -24.4 Halving time T (years) infinite 530 230 103 64 44 33 28 "Missing" births (%) 0 3.8 8.7 18.3 27.9 37.5 47.1 51.9 Net migration/Births (%) 0 4.0 9.5 22.4 38.7 60.0 89.1 108.0 Another way to interpret the different values of the TFR is to estimate the proportion of missing births compared to the target of 2.08, and to transform this proportion into the proportion of net migrants per 100 births necessary to compensate ( ) 3 With a sex ratio at birth of 105 boys for 100 girls and a survival probability of 98.6% between birth and reproductive age, 208 births correspond to three children dying, 105 men and 100 women still alive at reproductive age. http://www.demographic-research.org 183 4 The formula is simply a R0 ln =