To be or not to be a drug trafficker: Modeling criminal occupational choices

Violent deaths, kidnapping and extortion have spiked in Mexico’s border towns since 2004. Using a formal model and case studies from Mexico, I argue that such phenomena are partially explained by changes in the composition of illegal labor markets. Government permissiveness fostered territorial wars between Mexican drug cartels. To sustain such inter-cartel fights, drug leaders promoted the recruitment of outsiders into their forces; as a result, an illegal labor market –so far closed to non-blood-related individuals– opened and interacted with legal labor market incentives. The outcome was the emergence of a new generation of drug dealers that (a) disdain old mafia laws, (b) are more violent and (c) are also more prone to take part of other forms of “entrepreneurial” illegal occupations such as kidnapping and extortion. Recent changes in the scope, levels and forms of violence in Mexico can be understood by analyzing who is becoming a drug trafficker and why.