Bayesian Games and Auction Theory
نویسنده
چکیده
I. Bayesian Nash Equilibria of Games of Incomplete Information A. Very often it is natural to assume that the \physically" possible strategies are commonly known, but that the agents have private information concerning the payo s. 1. In principle it is not only each agent's information about payo s that is relevant, but also the agents' information about each others information about payo s, the agents' information about each others information about each others information about payo s, and so on. The space of such in nite hierarchies of beliefs can be described and analyzed, but it is a highly in nite dimensional thing employing advanced analytical tools. 2. One of the important contributions of the analysis just mentioned is to justify the simpler \types" model of Harsanyi (which we study here) by showing that \types" models are (in the relevant topology) dense in the set of all possible in nite hierarchy models. 3. A Bayesian game (in strategic form) is a tuple
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