On essential, (strictly) perfect equilibria

نویسنده

  • Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
چکیده

It is known that generic games within certain collections of infinite-action normal-form games have only essential equilibria. We point to a difficulty in showing that essential equilibria in generic games are (strictly) perfect, and we identify collections of games whose generic members have only essential and (strictly) perfect equilibria. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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تاریخ انتشار 2014