The Misleading Problem of Failed States: a ‘socio-geography’ of terrorism in the post-9/11 era

Contrary to a commonly held view, significant numbers of international terrorists do not come from failed states. Nor do failed states house many organisations that support terrorism. All states consistently fail some portions of their population. In fact, were we to generalise, it should only be along the following lines: from disenfranchised populations can come foot soldiers, from alienated populations can come terrorists. And these exist in pockets everywhere, including our own backyard. To the degree that these produce security problems, these problems are best handled by means other than direct military force. Failed states have been part of the debate over US foreign and national security policy since the end of the Cold War. Variously defined as states where centralised governing authority is absent, or as ungoverned or ungovernable areas, failed states became a concern for the USA when it found itself involved in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In these cases failed states presented humanitarian and security problems, undermining efforts to establish a more stable and prosperous international order. Debates about how to respond to these state failures frayed alliance relationships. In so far as security was an issue with failed states, discussions focused on destabilising refugee flows; the trafficking of drugs, guns and humans; the spread of disease; and the support and facilitation of terrorism. The connection between terrorism and failed states received new emphasis when Osama bin Laden took refuge in Afghanistan. Five years after the attacks of 11 September, a prevailing view holds that failed states support and facilitate terrorism. The US government’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, for example, contends that terrorists exploit failed states, using them to ‘plan, organize, train and prepare for operations’. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said of ‘weak and failing states’ that they ‘serve as global pathways that facilitate . . . the movement of criminals and terrorists’. An assortment of civilian and military officials and experts outside the US government worry Anna Simons and David Tucker are both in the Department of Defense Analysis Naval Postgraduate School, 589 Dyer Road, Monterey, CA 93943, USA. Email: [email protected]; [email protected]. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2007, pp 387 – 401 ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/07/020387–15 2007 Third World Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/01436590601153887 387 that Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, the Balkans, the Horn of Africa and certain areas of Latin America and West Africa are now or will become ungovernable areas where terrorists will recruit, plan and operate. Is this concern with failed states well founded? What exactly is the connection between ungoverned areas and terrorism? One thing is clear. International terrorists—individuals who travel from one country to another to commit acts of terrorism—do not appear to come predominantly or even significantly from failed states. Only one of the 11 September hijackers, for example, came from a state (Lebanon) that had failed. Foreign fighters in Iraq come mostly from Egypt, Syria, Sudan and Saudi Arabia (in that order). Of the 312 foreign fighters captured in Iraq between April and October 2005, only one hails from a failed state (Somalia) and three more from a state that has failed and may fail again (Lebanon). Mark Sageman’s published information on al-Qaida operatives shows that most are from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Algeria, Morocco and Indonesia (in that order). A separate, somewhat later count of al-Qaida operatives, based on open sources like Sageman’s, found that only a small percentage come from failed states. According to The 9 – 11 Commission Report, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has claimed that most of the people in al-Qaida camps were from Saudi Arabia and Yemen, neither a failed state, and only ‘10 percent were from elsewhere’. Finally, of the 759 prisoners that the Department of Defense acknowledged holding in Guantanamo Bay in May 2006, 34% come from failed states, if Afghanistan is included, but, if one removes Afghanistan from this list, only 1.4% come from failed, or arguably failed, states: Iraq (8), Somalia (1) and Chad (1). There are probably two principal reasons why failed states do not generate many international terrorists. First, although those who fight in failed states develop skills and tactics valuable to international terrorists (a point elaborated on below), those skills are in demand locally. Second, even if someone in a failed state wishes to operate as an international terrorist, it is unlikely that he would possess the credentials to pass easily through border controls, and such a person might well lack the sophistication to operate unnoticed in economically and technologically advanced societies. If international terrorists are looking for personnel, it would make more sense to recruit and then train those who are already acclimated to life in the developed societies that international terrorists want to operate in or attack, and who bear passports that do not arouse suspicion. The mention of training suggests another way that failed states might be used by international terrorists. If Americans consider Afghanistan a failed state (because the Taliban never consolidated control), then, as the 9 – 11 Commission Report makes clear, al-Qaida benefited from this by setting up camps there to vet potential terrorists, as well as train them. Nevertheless, not much evidence exists that other failed states are providing venues for terrorist training camps. For example, although arguing that ungoverned areas are vulnerable to use by international terrorists, US and allied forces operating in the Horn of Africa have found few if any al-Qaida personnel or camps. Concerned about the exploitation of failed states, academic analysts have ANNA SIMONS & DAVID TUCKER