INFORMATIONAL SIZE AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY By Richard
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چکیده
We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size.
منابع مشابه
CARESS Working Paper # 99 - 14 Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
We examine a general equilibrium model with asymetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a con°ict between incentive compatibility and Pareto e±ciency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the con°ict between incentive compatibility and e±ciency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are su±ciently small informationally .
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تاریخ انتشار 2002