Computing Rational Decisions In Extensive Games With Limited Foresight

نویسنده

  • Paolo Turrini
چکیده

We study extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their actions and try to exploit the opponents’ believed weaknesses in order to improve upon the final outcome. We build upon existing models of games with limited foresight, endowing players with the ability of higher-order reasoning, and proposing a novel solution concept to address intuitions coming from real game play. We analyse the resulting equilibria, devising an effective procedure to compute them.

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تاریخ انتشار 2016