Independence and Bayesian Updating Methods

نویسنده

  • Rodney W. Johnson
چکیده

Duda, Hart, and Nilsson [ 1] have set forth a method for rule-based inference systems to use in updating the probabilities of hypotheses on the basis of multiple items of new evidence. Pednault, Zucker, and Muresan [2] claimed to give condi­ tions under which independence assumptions made by Duda et al. preclude updating-that is, prevent the evidence from altering the probabilities of the hypotheses. Glymour [3] refutes Pednault et al.'s claim with a counterexample of a rather special form (one item of evidence is incompatible with all but one of the hypotheses); he raises, but leaves open, the question whether their result would be true with an added assumption to rule out such special cases. We show that their result does not hold even with the added assumption, but that it can nevertheless be largely salvaged. Namely, under the conditions assumed by Pednault et al., at most one of the items of evidence can alter the probability of any given hypothesis; thus, although updating is possible, multiple updating for any of the hypotheses is precluded. BACKGROUND Duda, Hart, and Nilsson [1] consider the problem of updating the probability of a hypothesis H w�th prior probability P (H) when new evidence is obtained in the form of proposi­ tions Ei for which the conditional probabilities P (E,. I H) and P (Ei I li) are known. They assume that the E,are conditionally independent, both on condition H and on condition H, so that m P (E 1 • • 'Em I H)= II P (E,I H) i=1 m P(E1 ·''Em I H)= II P(Ei I H). i=1 They can then write an updating formula for the odds on H in terms of a product of likelihood ratios: 28 P(H I E1' ·'Em) = P(H) IT P(Ei I H) P(Ji I E1' ··Em) P(Ji) i=1 P(E,I H) . Pednault, Zucker, and Muresan [2], in analyzing this updating scheme, considered the consequences of imposing the independence assumptions for each hypothesis Hi of a jointly exhaustive, mutually exclusive set. They [2] and other writers (see [3] and other references therein) agree that the assumptions are unreasonably strong, but there has been some confusion over the exact extent of the undesirable consequences. Pednault et al. [2] concluded that if there were at least three hypotheses, then no updating could take place-that the assumptions are too strong to be satisfied unless p (E,. I Hi) = p (E,. I Hi) = p (E,.) . holds for all i and j , and consequently . P (Hi I E 1' · · Em) = P (Hi). However, Glymour [3] gives a counterexample to their conclusion-three jointly exhaustive, mutu­ ally exclusive hypotheses � and two evidence propositions Ei that satisfy the independence assumptions but allow updating to occur. He points out that Pednault et al. had relied on an erroneous result claimed by Hussain [4], also refuted by his counterexample. Glymour notes that the evidence proposition E 2 ·of his counterex­ ample has the special property that P (E 2 I H 2) = P(E2I H3) = 0, so that E2 determines a posterior probability of 1 for one hypothesis, H 17 and 0 for the rest. He raises, and leaves open, the question whether Pednault et al. 's result would be true with the additional requirement that for all i , (1) In the next section we answer that question by giving a counterexample that satisfies ( 1 ). Glymour's counterexample has another spe­ cial property, one that is sufficient to make it a valid _ counterexample: P (E 1 I Hi)= P (E 1 I Hi) = P (E 1), so that E 1 produces no updating; only E2 produces updating. We give a I

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Subjective probability, confidence, and Bayesian updating

I derive a unique subjective probabilistic belief p and Bayesian updating for this belief from ambiguity averse preferences. To do so, I assume an exogenous information set ∆ of possible probabilistic scenarios on the state space S. Every uncertain prospect f is evaluated via a mixture of the unique subjective belief p with the least favorable scenario for f in the set ∆. The weight of p in thi...

متن کامل

Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence

Jeffrey updating is a natural extension of Bayesian updating to cases where the evidence is uncertain. But, the resulting degrees of belief appear to be sensitive to the order in which the uncertain evidence is acquired, a rather un-Bayesian looking effect. This order dependence results from the way in which basic Jeffrey updating is usually extended to sequences of updates. The usual extension...

متن کامل

Bayesian updating rules and AGM belief revision

We interpret the problem of updating beliefs as a choice problem (selecting a posterior from a set of admissible posteriors) with a reference point (prior). We use AGM belief revision to define the support of admissible posteriors after observing zero probability events and investigate two classes of updating rules for probabilities : 1) ”minimum distance” updating rules which select the poster...

متن کامل

Justifying Bayesianism by Dynamic Decision Principles

As yet, no general agreement has been reached on whether the Bayesian or the frequentist (Neyman-Pearson, NP) approach to statistics is to be preferred. Whereas Bayesians adhere to coherence conditions of de Finetti, Savage, and others, frequentists do not consider these conditions normative and deliberately and knowingly violate them. Hence further arguments, bringing more clarity on the disag...

متن کامل

Eecient Bayesian Local Computation for Dynamic Forecasting of Competitive Markets

SUMMARY The problem of forecasting high-dimensional time series with a hierarchical structure and cross-correlated components is considered. The methodology is illustrated in the context of forecasting weekly sales of a large number of competing products from a wholesale retail depot, but similar structures arise in many nancial and economic contexts, where monitoring of a large number of syste...

متن کامل

Generalized neo-additive capacities and updating

This paper shows that, for Choquet expected utility preferences, the axioms consquentialism, state independence and conditional certainty equivalent consistency under updating characterise a family of capacities, which we call Generalized Neo-Additive Capacities (GNAC). This family contains as special cases, among others, neo-additive capacities as introduced by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Gra...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Artif. Intell.

دوره 29  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 1985