Socializing Children through Language

It is difficult for most of us to imagine making sense of the social world without automatically thinking about the beliefs, emotions, desires, and intentions of other people. Picture yourself in a preschool classroom. You see a boy and a girl rushing to the painting easels in the art area. The girl quickly dons a painting apron. The boy is turning his head back and forth with a frown on his face. The girl points to the counter near the sink. The boy picks up an apron from the counter and puts it on. They both begin painting, standing side by side. The girl smiles broadly as she paints. The boy looks at the girl's painting and says something. The girl suddenly stops smiling. She stomps her feet and goes to find the teacher. To explain what we see in this scene, we think automatically and effortlessly about mental states (shown in italics). The children rush to the easels because they want to paint and feel excited. The boy turns his head back and forth because he does not know where to find an apron. The girl points to the counter because she understands that the boy is confused, and she knows where to find a second apron. The girl is smiling because she is happy about her painting. The girl stomps her feet and seeks out the teacher because the boy's comment made her feel upset and she wants help. How could we make sense of this scene without engaging in this type of mind reading? We could, perhaps, simply assume that it is customary for all children to run—and not walk—toward easels, and for all boys to frown and wait for someone to point before donning an apron. This type of explanation does not rely on inferences about mental states, and it immediately strikes us as absurd (see Baron-Cohen, 1995; for a more elaborate discussion of this issue). Further, interpreting this social scene without thinking about