Social Norms, Labor Market Opportunities, and the Marriage Market Penalty for Skilled Women∗

In most of the developed world, skilled women marry at a lower rate than unskilled ones. We document heterogeneity across countries in how the marriage market penalty for skilled women has evolved over time. As labor market opportunities for women have improved, the penalty has been growing in some countries but shrinking in others. We propose a theoretical model in which the (negative) social attitudes towards working women might contribute towards the lower marriage rate of skilled women, and might also induce a non-linear relationship between their labor market prospects and their marriage outcomes. The model is suited to understand the dynamics of the marriage market penalty for skilled women over time within a country with set social attitudes towards working women. The model also delivers predictions about how the marriage market penalty for skilled women should react to changes in their labor market opportunities across countries with more or less conservative attitudes towards working women. We test the key assumptions and predictions of this model in a panel of 23 developed countries, as well as in a panel of US states. ∗Research support from the Global Asia Institute JY Pillay Comparative Asia Research Centre Grant is gratefully acknowledged. Maria Dolores Palacios provided excellent research assistance. †Booth School of Business, University of Chicago. Email: [email protected] ‡Questrom School of Business, Boston University. Email: [email protected] §Boston College. Email: [email protected] ¶National University of Singapore. Email: [email protected]