The Phenomenal Concept Strategy: a reply to Chalmers
نویسندگان
چکیده
A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This paper presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers’ argument against it, and a defense of the strategy against his argument.
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