A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders

نویسنده

  • Winand Emons
چکیده

Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the sanction for the second offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history dependent strategies. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. The optimal sanction scheme is decreasing rather than increasing in the number of offenses. Indeed, the sanction for the first offense equals the entire wealth while the sanction for the second offense is zero.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

لزوم استفاده‌ی محدود از کیفر سالب آزادی بر مبنای فقه اسلامی

Imprisonment of religious thinking generally not considered a major penalty, but as an example of chastising, Security and Training is mostly correct, deter and prevent the recurrence of crime.Imprisonment as a means to stave off the threat of Islamic jurisprudence as well as some people in the community as well. Using large-scale copying the prison system and the prison sentences to punish the...

متن کامل

Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account

Are repeat offenders more culpable than first-time offenders? In the United States, the most important determinant of punishment for a crime, other than the seriousness of the crime itself, is the offender's criminal history. Despite the popularity of the view that repeat offenders deserve to be treated more harshly than first-time offenders, there is no satisfactory retributivist account of th...

متن کامل

Escalating Penalties – An Infinite Game - Approach

The paper provides an economic rationale for punishing repeat offenders with increasing sanctions. We analyse the optimal intertemporal punishment scheme within an infinite game framework. The legal authority is assumed to minimize the social cost of punishment under the constraint of keeping delinquency at a maximal tolerable level. This level is exogenously determined. JEL classification: K14

متن کامل

Causes of Judicial and Legal Criminal Policy Disagreement in Drug-Related Offenses from the Legal-Ethical Approach

Background: The legislative review of the criminal record on the crime of repetition and the severity of the punishment for repeated offenders indicates that the legislator firstly used various laws to include repetition of crime, and in some cases such as drug offenses and for criminal reasons. It has taken into account a certain degree of exacerbation that is markedly different from what is s...

متن کامل

Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders

First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act twice the optimal sanctions are the offender’s entire wealth for the first and zero for the second crime. Then we ask the question whether this decreasing sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a rent-seeking government stick to this sanction scheme after the first crime has occurred. If the benefit...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2001