An E¢cient Auction¤
نویسندگان
چکیده
An analogue of Vickrey’s (1961) multi-unit auction is provided when bidders have interdependent values and one-dimensional private information. The analogue is strategically equivalent to a collection of two-bidder single-unit second-price auctions and it possesses an e¢cient ex-post equilibrium. ¤ We wish to thank Larry Ausubel for very helpful discussions. We also thank three referees and the editor for suggesting important improvements in the exposition. Both authors gratefully acknowledge ...nancial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-9905599, SES-0001744).
منابع مشابه
An Ex-Post E¢cient Auction¤
An analogue of Vickrey’s (1961) multi-unit auction is provided when bidders have interdependent values. The analogue is strategically equivalent to a collection of two-bidder single-unit second-price auctions and it possesses an ex-post e¢cient equilibrium. As an application of this result, it is shown that the FCC auction possesses an e¢cient equilibrium in the case of homogeneous goods. Condi...
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تاریخ انتشار 2000