Equilibrium Theory under Ambiguity
نویسندگان
چکیده
We extend the classical results on the Walras-core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economies, i.e., economies where agents maximize Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). The interest of considering ambiguity arises from the fact that, in the presence of MEU decision making, there is no conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility, (contrary to the Bayesian decision making). Our modeling of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy allows for an infinite number of states of the world, and our method of proofs for the existence and equivalence results is different from the Banach space methods used in the literature. JEL classification: D51, D81, D82.
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