How Emotions Shape Moral Behavior: Some Answers (and Questions) for the Field of Moral Psychology

Within the past decade, the field of moral psychology has begun to disentangle the mechanics behind moral judgments, revealing the vital role that emotions play in driving these processes. However, given the well-documented dissociation between attitudes and behaviors, we propose that an equally important issue is how emotions inform actual moral behavior – a question that has been relatively ignored up until recently. By providing a review of recent studies that have begun to explore how emotions drive actual moral behavior, we propose that emotions are instrumental in fueling real-life moral actions. Because research examining the role of emotional processes on moral behavior is currently limited, we push for the use of behavioral measures in the field in the hopes of building a more complete theory of real-life moral behavior. Within the last decade, social psychologists have started to elucidate the processes underlying moral decision making. This trend is not surprising, given the potential applicability and consequential nature of moral psychology research. Indeed, moral transgressions can cause detrimental social and economic outcomes. In 2007, the US Internal Revenue Service estimated that tax evasion cost the American economy $345bn, or about 14% of federal revenues for the fiscal year (Kaufman, 2007). At a local level, schools often suffer from academic misconduct such as cheating and plagiarism (Stern & Havlicek, 1986), while large corporations often witness employee theft (Hollinger & Clark, 1983) and sexual abuse in the workplace (Richman et al., 1999). Moral stability is vital to a well-functioning society. As such, psychologists have begun to explore the integral role that emotions may play in inf luencing our moral judgments. Surprisingly, however, very little social–psychological research has explored how emotional processes inf luence moral behavior, leaving a notable gap in the field of moral psychology. So while we may know about the ways in which emotions inform moral judgments (e.g. Haidt, 2001) and about a handful of factors that may inf luence ethical behaviors (e.g. Darley & Batson, 1973; Milgram, 1963), we know far less about how emotions shape behaviors in moral situations. In the current paper, we review the burgeoning research that has begun to fill in this gap by exploring how emotions affect moral actions. In doing so, we will propose that emotions may be instrumental in deterring transgressions and promoting prosocial behavior but will also discuss cases in which emotions may drive transgressions. While numerous review articles have proposed models and have discussed the importance of emotions for moral judgment (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Pizarro, 2000), to our knowledge, the current article is the first to provide a detailed discussion of emotions in the context of moral behavior. Because the relationship between self-report and actual behavior is blurry at best (i.e. Blasi, 1980), we propose that elucidating the role of emotions for moral © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2 How Emotions Shape Moral Behavior behavior is an important endeavor. Although the over-reliance on self-report measures is a concern in almost all areas of social psychology (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007), we propose that this “behavioral gap” in the moral psychology literature is especially problematic due to the pivotal role that emotions play in moral decision making. We propose that the inability to tap into emotions during hypothetical decision making (e.g. Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) makes morality self-report measures particularly susceptible to error. The fact that moral psychology has been dominated by the study of moral judgments (an area of study that finds its roots in philosophy and thus lends itself well to self-report) might explain why this field has been slower than others to include measures of actual behavior in its investigations. Because morality is notoriously difficult to define and moral rules differ based on a variety of factors, including culture, religion, and political orientation, we limit our discussion here to moral norms that encompass the foundations of harm/care and fairness. Previous research suggests that there may be less variability in the degree to which these principles are endorsed in comparison to others such as sanctity, authority, and loyalty (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Indeed, recent work has suggested that perceptions of harm may underlie and predict the severity of moral judgments previously thought to encompass unrelated moral foundations (Gray, Schein, &Ward, 2014). On a practical level, the principles of harm/care and fairness seem to apply most closely to behavioral measures used in moral psychology and are characteristic of the types of moral situations that people are most likely to encounter in everyday life (i.e. cheating, cooperation, offering help, etc.). In the current account, we review empirical evidence supporting the notion that affective arousal, and emotions more generally, is instrumental in driving ethical behavior. In doing this, we propose that emotions are integral in inf luencing moral behavior in real-life situations and provide possible explanations for why this mechanism might have evolved. Although a handful of experiments in social psychology have in fact included measures of actual moral behavior (e.g. Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Gino &Ariely, 2012; Gino &Galinsky, 2012; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Milgram, 1963; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011; van’t Veer, Stel, & van Beest (2014), empirical research examining the effects of emotion on moral behavior has only recently commenced and is therefore limited. This, consequently, presents a challenge in drawing solid conclusions, no less synthesizing a comprehensive theory of emotions and moral behavior. We discuss these issues as they relate to the current state of the moral psychology field and propose future directions that have the potential to bring the field forward. Discrepancies among Attitudes, Intentions, and Actions The goal of the current paper is not to criticize research that has been conducted within the realm of moral judgment. Understanding the way in which individuals arrive at moral judgments sheds light on the broader scope of individuals’ beliefs about what is right and wrong. Critically, judgments often serve as a primary step on the path to behavior (Ajzen, 1991). As such, we believe that research on moral judgments is of great importance. However, moral judgments or decisions in hypotheticalmoral dilemmas might not always map onto moral behavior in real life. Indeed, decades of research have revealed an attitude–behavior discrepancy. In his book about children’s’moral development, Piaget (1932/1997) suggested that “the relations between thought and action are very far from being as simple as is commonly supposed” (p. 176). Since then, this sentiment has been confirmed by plenty of empirical evidence –most notably, Festinger’s (1957) work on cognitive dissonance – which has shown that individuals often engage in behavior that is incongruous with their attitudes (also see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). For instance, peoples’ judgments of moral acceptability of specific behaviors (i.e. sacrificing © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/1 (2015): 1–14, 10.1111/spc3.12154 How Emotions Shape Moral Behavior 3 one life in order to save a greater number of lives – a utilitarian choice) do not always predict their intention to engage in those same behaviors (Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, & Wicker, 2013). The discrepancy between attitude and behavior may be more pronounced in the moral domain partly because of the normative nature of morality. Because people generally desire to see themselves and be seen by others as moral and that moral actions are often costly to the self, people often endorse moral values but fail to act morally (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). This issue was investigated in a review of numerous studies exploring the relationship between self-reported morality and moral behavior (i.e. honesty). The results seem to be inconclusive, however, such that approximately half of the studies document a positive association between self-reported morality and honesty, while the other half report no significant relationship (Blasi, 1980). The same discrepancy also exists betweenmoral intention andmoral behavior. Several studies have now found that there exists a clear gap between peoples’ forecasts and actual behavior in various moral dilemmas (Epley &Dunning, 2000; Teper, Inzlicht, & Page-Gould, 2011). These studies suggest that people are not always able to predict their behavior across a variety of moral dilemmas, including cheating, charity donation, and other cooperative behavior. Further, a recent study found a significant disconnect between peoples’ responses to a hypothetical moral dilemma (i.e. the famous trolley problem) and their behavior in a virtual-reality trolley problem. Specifically, participants were significantly more likely to make utilitarian choices in the virtual-reality condition than in the self-report condition (Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro, & Silani, 2013, but see Navarrete, McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2012). This body of work suggests that attitudes, intentions, and actions may not always align. As we will outline next, both classic attitudes research and more recent work on decision making can provide insight into why this might be the case. Conceptual problems with self-report in moral psychology We propose that the issue with relying on self-report in moral psychology depends on which type of measure is being used. Currently, the field is dominated by work on moral judgments (scenarios that require a judgment or reaction – i.e. How morally acceptable is it to burn your national f lag?), as well as moral forecasts (predictions of future decisions in moral dilemmas – i.e. Would you pull the lever to divert the trolley? Would you cheat on a test for $5?). Since both attitudes and intentions are important precursors to behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), we discuss the way in which both of the above measures relate to behavior. We suggest that although there is likely some reliable relationship between attitudes, intentions, and behaviors, a variety of factors may weaken it. Classic attitudes research might help explain why judgments may not always align with behaviors. Namely, people often transgress even when they recognize that their actions are morally “wrong.” We do this by using in various “moral disengagement” strategies, such as diffusing responsibility, victim dehumanization, or misrepresenting consequences, which then justify our transgressions (e.g. Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). Similarly, people often endorse moral values to uphold a moral self-image, while engaging in unethical behaviors such as cheating (Batson et al., 1999). This attitude–behavior dissociation presents a challenge for applying findings in the domain of moral judgments to real-life behavior. In the case of moral forecasting, the self-report problem is twofold. First, many of the scenarios that are used are extreme and lack ecological validity (e.g. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Second, the emotions that may be present during moral forecasting are likely quite different (certainly not as intense) than those elicited during © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/1 (2015): 1–14, 10.1111/spc3.12154 4 How Emotions Shape Moral Behavior real-life moral decision making (Teper et al., 2011). Although there are undoubtedly other reasons why people may misforecast their behaviors in moral dilemmas, such as limited contextual information (e.g. FeldmanHall et al., 2012), here, we focus on the emotional factors that may cause the relationship between moral forecasts and behaviors to break down. Research on affective forecasting has found that individuals have poor insight into their future emotional states (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005). Thus, if emotions are important for actions and decisions (Schwarz & Clore, 1988; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008), it then follows that individuals might not be able to accurately predict their behavior. Related work on the hot–cold empathy gap has found that people fail to appreciate the extent to which affective experiences, such as embarrassment and states of high craving, drive their behaviors (Sayette, Loewenstein, Griffin, & Black, 2008; Van Boven, Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005). One potential explanation for this phenomenon is grounded in psychophysiological work that posits that our behavior is driven primarily by “somatic markers” (Damasio, 1994). Importantly, these “somatic markers” or affective bodily experiences are typically fainter during imagined or recalled instances of events than they are during real-life events (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Patil et al., 2013; Teper et al., 2011), resulting in discrepancies between behaviors and forecasts. For this reason, we suggest that if we are interested in learning about the factors that motivate people to act ethically or unethically, we cannot rely on measures of attitudes, beliefs, or intentions alone. Why Do People Behave Morally? Although the field of moral psychology has been dominated by studies of moral judgment and hypothetical moral dilemmas, a handful of social psychology studies have examined actual behavior. This research has answered several fundamental questions about the way in which social factors inf luence moral actions. For instance, classic work in social psychology revealed the profound effects that authority and obedience have on moral behavior (Haney et al., 1973; Milgram, 1963). It would be quite difficult to imagine that emotions such as fear or anxiety were not at play in these studies. However, the authors did not possess the empirical evidence to make such conclusions, as emotions were never measured directly (Brock, 1969). The numerous experiments on bystander intervention have the same issue (see Fischer et al., 2011). Although one might expect that emotional intensity (e.g. empathy, distress) increases as the number of bystanders decreases, the extent to which these emotions were involved in people’s decisions to offer help in the bystander studies remains an open question. More recent research has shed light on how factors such as self-control (Mead et al., 2009), religiosity (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), and framing (Mazar et al., 2008; Teper & Inzlicht, 2011) affect moral behaviors, suggesting that progress is in fact being made. But although we might know about the ways in which various social and contextual factors inf luence prosocial and moral behavior (also see Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Gino, Gu, & Zhong, 2009), the investigation of actual emotions in these processes has been overlooked, at least on an empirical level. We believe that studying emotions in the context of moral behaviors is important for two reasons: (1) research on emotions and moral judgments has suggested that emotions may inform moral decision making (e.g. Haidt, 2001; although we cannot assume that these patterns will translate directly to moral behavior), and (2) if emotions are important for other real-life behaviors (Sayette et al., 2008; Van Boven et al., 2005; Zeelenberg et al., 2008), there is good reason to believe that they will be important for real-life moral behaviors as well. Although here, we highlight the role that emotion plays in driving moral behaviors, we believe that a variety of processes interact to inf luence moral choices. Specifically, we believe that cognitive forces (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003), conscious motivations (Blasi, 1999; Kroll & Egan, © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/1 (2015): 1–14, 10.1111/spc3.12154 How Emotions Shape Moral Behavior 5 2004), and social factors (e.g. Gino et al., 2009a) all interact iteratively with emotional processes to shape moral decisions. Emotion is integrated with motivation (Tomkins, 1982) as well as a variety of basic cognitive operations, such as attention, memory, control, and even basic perception (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012; Schmeichel & Inzlicht, 2013). Although all of these processes are important for moral behaviors, we want to suggest that the transient experience of emotion drives moral actions on a moment-by-moment basis, and as such, we will limit our discussion to the role of emotional processes.