COMPETITIVE SCREENING AND MARKET SEGMENTATION By
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competitive Screening in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection: A “Cover Version” of Bester’s Model
This note presents a simple model of competitive screening in a credit market with adverse selection, where firms use interest and collateral as instruments for screening borrowers’ risk type. While the basic ideas appear in Bester (1985,1987), this version of the model is far more useful pedagogically, also (arguably) when compared with models that are more conventionally employed for this pur...
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Competitive intelligence (CI) has become one of the major subjects for researchers in recent years. The present research is aimed to achieve a part of the CI by investigating the scientific articles on this field through text mining in three interrelated steps. In the first step, a total of 1143 articles released between 1987 and 2016 were selected by searching the phrase "competitive intellige...
متن کاملBonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on performance pay and other high-powered incen...
متن کاملMarket Feedback, Cost System Choice and Competitive Pricing: the Advantage of Not Being a Leader
This study experimentally investigates the value of cost report accuracy in an interactive pricing context. Market agents received feedback about their own profits via either a volume-based costing or a more accurate activity-based costing report. They also received a typical market report containing the performance of their rivals. While prior work suggested that market discipline and learning...
متن کاملDiscussion Papers Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Labor Supply
We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets when individuals take unobservable labor supply decisions. Precautionary labor motives introduce countervailing incentives in the insurance market, and equilibria with positive profits can occur even in the standard case in which individuals exogenously differ in risk only. We then extend the model to allow for both privately known risks an...
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تاریخ انتشار 2006