Naturalizing consciousness: a theoretical framework.
نویسنده
چکیده
Consciousness has a number of apparently disparate properties, some of which seem to be highly complex and even inaccessible to outside observation. To place these properties within a biological framework requires a theory based on a set of evolutionary and developmental principles. This paper describes such a theory, which aims to provide a unifying account of conscious phenomena.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
دوره 100 9 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003