Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning
نویسندگان
چکیده
We provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players’ belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, as well as sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome in generic games with perfect information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 106 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002