Risk Analysis of Intentional Electromagnetic Interference on Critical Infrastructures

Our modern society depends on the functioning and interplay of a wealth of infrastructures. Practically all of these infrastructures are in some form or another, dependent on electrical and electronic systems. The majority of modern infrastructure is dependent on electric power and controlled by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Electronic systems are sensitive to electromagnetic interference and at the same time, sources of electromagnetic interference are becoming more readily available on the market. This means that certain important electronic infrastructure could be exposed to the risk of intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI). Therefore, and also due to the complex nature of electronic infrastructure, a comprehensive risk assessment methodology is needed. A game-theoretic approach for quantitative risk assessment of the recently recognised threat of intentional electromagnetic interference on critical infrastructures is presented. The thesis bridges the gap between the fields of IEMI and risk analysis and lays a foundation for further development within this multidisciplinary field. In paper I, the probability distribution function of the electric field strength from a continuous wave source is estimated in complex building structures. Probability distribution functions are combined for small and large scale fluctuations. In paper II, a structured risk assessment framework is presented for identifying and quantifying the risk of IEMI on a distribution network infrastructure. The dimensions and components of risk are dissected and a suitable definition of risk is formulated. In paper III, an operational model is formulated to optimise the operation of a wireless network under the course of a coordinated jamming attack. The model captures the time dimension and illustrates how the network operator must dynamically control the network so as to reduce the total network operational cost.