Negotiation Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in [5, 6]. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of agents force that a negotiation terminates (resp. block the negotiation so that it goes on forever)?; can the coalition force a given outcome of the negotiation? We show that for arbitrary negotiations the problems are EXPTIME-complete. Then we show that for sound and deterministic or even weakly deterministic negotiations the problems can be solved in PTIME. Notice that the input of the problems is a negotiation, which can be exponentially more compact than its state space.
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