The Mimetic Origins of Self - Consciousness in Phylo - , Onto - and Robotogenesis

The paper presents and defends the mimetic hypothesis concerning the origin of selfconsciousness in three different kinds of development: hominid evolution, the mind of the child, and the epigenesis of mind within an artificial autonomous system, a robot. The proposed crucial factor for the emergence of self-consciousness is the ability to map between one’s own subjective bodyimage and those of others, supported by a partially innate ‘mirror system’ [1]. Combined with social interaction, this gives rise to intersubjectivity and starts a developmental cycle of (a) increased objectification of one’s body-image, (b) increased volitional control, (c) increased understanding of the intentionality of others and (d) increased understanding of one’s own intentionality. The hypothesis has far reaching theoretical implications: self-consciousness and empathy are co-determined; language and tool-use are not causes, but rather consequences of increased self-consciousness; most of the symptoms of autism can be accounted for as resulting from an impairment of the mirror system. The implications are negative for non-representational approaches to robotics [2] and in favor of approaches based on imitation/mimesis [3], [4]. My sense of myself grows by imitation of you and my sense of yourself grows in terms of myself. James Baldwin